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THE IM PACT OF THE FOIA ON NLRB
DISCOVERY PROCEDURES

Since the passage of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 1 in
1967, in.any suits havt: bt:en brought against the National Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter NLRB or Board) by citizens seeking
to compel disclosure of its investigatory files. 2 The most soughtafter documents in such cases are witness statements or affidavits
collected by the Board's field examiners prior to unfair labor practice heariqgs. 3 These statements are the primary source of the

1
5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV 1974). For other general analyses of the Freedom of Information Act; see K. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. ·
761 (1967); Katz, Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1261 (1970); Koch, The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestions
Jot Making Information Available to the Public, 32 MD. L. REv. 189 (1972); Kramer &
Weinberg, The Freedom of Information Act, 63 GEO. L.J. 49 (1974); Nader, Freedom from
Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1970); Project,
Federal Administrative Law Developments-1971, 1972 DUKE L.J. 115; Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971 (1975); Note, The
Freedom of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150 (1969); Note,
The Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974: An Analysis, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV.
951 (1975).
2
The Comptroller of the NLRB estimates that FOIA suits cost the Board $400,000 in
1975. 27 LAB. L.J. 190 (1976).
3 Id. Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U .S.C. § 158 (1970), defines an
unfair labor practice as an interference with certain specified rights of employees by either
an employer or a union.
The NLRB has divided the United States into thirteen regions, each headed by a Regional
Director, who is under the direct supervision of the General Counsel of the NLRB. An
unfair labor practice charge may be filed by any person with the regional offices of the
NLRB. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1976). After the charge is investigated by a Board field examiner
the Regional Director determines whether a complaint should be issued against the charged
party. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1976). If the Regional Director decides
that the charge is without merit, he may recommend that the complainant voluntarily
withdraw the charge, or may dismiss it himself. 29 C.F.R. § 101.6 (1976). If the charging
party is dissatisfied with the dismissal, it may appeal to the Board's General Counsel. The
General Counsel may uphold the dismissal, or direct the Regional Director to proceed with
the case. If the General Counsel upholds the dismissal, he must state the grounds for his
decision. 29 C.F.R. § 102.19(c) (1976).
When the General Counsel upholds the dismissal, the memoranda generated by his staff
reflecting the decision-making process are discoverable. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
421 U.S. 132 (1975). Although the General Counsel's decision is not reviewable within the
NLRB, discovery of the reasoning behind his decision may help appellants perceive stan- ·
<lards for successful appeals, and also give them grounds for seeking relief in the courts when
it appears that the General Counsel's decision was arbitrary or capricious. Sarnoff & Falkin,
The FOJA and the NLRB, 15 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 1267, 1286 (1974).
If a complaint is issued, it must contain notice of the time and place of the scheduled
hearing, as well as a description of the acts which constitute the alleged unfair labor
practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (1976). The Regional Director
continues to investigate the charge, and if the matter cannot be settled, a Board attorney is
appointed to P,resent the evidence in support of the complellnt. This occurs relatively
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Board's evidence against parties that have allegedly committed
unfair labor practices. 4
A prerequisite to filing a suit under the FOIA is the exhaustion of
administrative remedies; in an unfair labor practice hearing, this
means petitioning the Board for discovery. 5 The increase in the
number of suits against the Board under the FOIA demonstrates a
growing dissatisfa.ction with the Board's discovery procedures.
This article will discuss the impact of the FOIA on the Board's
policies and practices and will examine various factors which must
be considered in applying the Act to the NLRB.
I.

THE FRAMEWORK OF

NLRB

DISCOVERY

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) contains no provisions dealing specifically with discovery procedures. 6 Section
lO(b) provides, however, that Board proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with federal rules of evidence "so far as is
practicable.'' 7 One court has interpreted this language to mean that
the discovery procedures available under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are applicable in Board proceedings. 8 Most courts have
decided, however, that section lO(b) of the NLRA does not provide for any particular discovery procedures and does not preclude
the Board from promulgating its own discovery rules. 9 The Board's

for

infrequently. In fiscal 1975;
instance, %.2 percent of all unfair labor practice cases were
settled prior to a hearing. 40 NLRB ANN. REP. 5 (1975). In the event a hearing is required,
an administrative law judge presides over the hearing and decides the case. 29 C.F.R. §§
101. I0(a), 102.34-.35 (1976). If neither party files an exception to the administrative law
judge's decision, the Board automatically adopts his opinion. When an exception is filed, the
Board will decide the case. 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(b) (1976) .
• See NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL, UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS §
10056.2 (Apr. 1975): "Whenever possible the charging party's case, if one exists, should be
established through interviews with the charging party and with witnesses offered by the
charging party." See also id. at § 10058.2: "The keystone of the investigation is the
affidavit." (Emphasis in original).
5
Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 910
(1%1).
6
See generally Manoli & Joseph, The National Labor Relations Board and Discovery
Procedures, 18 Ao. L. REV. 9 (1%6); Note, Labor Law-Pre-Hearing Discovery of Employee's Statements, 48 N.C.L. REV. 368 (1970).
7
29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). The pertinent part of the statute provides: "Any such
proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of
evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil
procedure for the district courts of the United States .... "
8
McLain Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 521 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1974).
9
NLRB v. lnterboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 197-0); NLRB v. Leprino
Cheese Co., 424 F.2d 184 (10th Cir. 1970); Electromec Design & Dev. Co., Inc. v. NLRB,
409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968); Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205 (7th
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rules prohibit any discovery prior to the hearing, but allow disclosure of witness statements after the witness has testified at the
hearing. 10 NLRB regulations also prohibit Board employees from
releasing information to the public without written permission from
the Chairman of the NLRB or the Board's General Counsel until
after the witness has testified. 11 Depositions are allowed only when
witnesses are unable to testify at the hearing. 12 Administrative law
judges have discretion to allow discovery when there is good cause
shown, 13 but have rarely done so. 14
· Prior to the enactment of the FOIA, there were relatively few
suits to compel discovery in unfair labor practice proceedings.
When discovery requests did come to trial, most courts would
overturn a denial of discovery only where the administrative law
judge had abused his discretion, resulting in prejudice to the
charged party . 15 Under this ~tandard courts generally denied access to Board files, 16 thereby discouraging requests for discovery.
The leading ~ase in this period was NLRB v. Vapor Blast Manufacturing Company. 17 Vapor Blast resisted enforcement of an NLRB
order, claiming that the Board's refusal to allow discovery of

Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 88 (1961); NLRB v. Globe Wireless, 193 F.2d 748 (9th Cir.
1951).
10
29 C.F.R. § 102. I 18(b)(I) (1976).
11
29 C.F.R. § 102. I 18(a)(2) (1976).
12 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1976) specifies that all testimony is to be taken orally at the hearing
unless th·ere is a showing of good cause why this cannot occur.
13 29 C.F.R. § 102.30(a) (1976).
14
See Electromec Design & Dev. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631,635 (9th Cir. 1969);
NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
955 (1968).
15
See, e.g., NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968), where the court upheld the decision of the Board denying
discovery, stating that even though the trial examiner had abused his discretion in denying
the employer's petition to take depositions of potential witnesses, there was no obvious
prejudice to the appealing party. Charged parties have succeeded in obtaining Board documents during enforcement proceedings in the federal courts of appeals. These decisions,
however, concerned only the discoverability of Board material in federal courts, and did not
deal with the validity of the Board's discovery procedure. Fusco v. Richard W. Kaese
Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Shauffier v. Highway Truck Drivers &
Helpers, Local 107, 196 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
16 See Electromec Design & Dev. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631,635 (9th Cir. 1969);
NLRB v. Wichita Television Corp., 277 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir. i960); NLRB v. Gala-Mo
Arts, Inc., 232F.2d 102, 106(8thCir.1956); NLRBv. Globe Wireless, 193 F.2d748, 751 (9th
Cir. 1951).
17
287 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961). Vapor Blast had sued to force
disclosure of witness affidavits prior to the unfair labor practice hearing. The Seventh
Circuit held, however, that Vapor Blast had to exhaust its administrative remedies before it
could seek relief in the courts. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205 (7th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364. U.S. 910 (1961). Vapor Blast then appealed to the Regional Director
and simultaneously petitioned the General Counsel for access to the affidavits. The General
Counsel ultimately rejected both the de novo petition and the appeal, and Vapor Blast
subsequently lost on the merits in the unfair labor practice hearing. When Vapor Blast
refused to comply with the Board's order, the Board brought enforcement proceedings in
the Court of Appeals.
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witness affidavits constituted a denial of procedural due process . 18
In enforcing the Board's order, the court held that the discovery
rules promulgated by the NLRB did not per se violate Vapor
Blast's constitutional right to procedural due process, and noted
that the Board possessed broad power to formulate rules to guide
its internal administration. 19 The court, by applying the rational
basis test, found that the confidentiality of employee affidavits was
necessary to preclude employer retaliation and to insure full disclosure to field examiners. 20 Moreover, it held that section lO(b) of
the NLRA did not require the adoption of the entire discovery
procedure contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
court stressed that the Board had the responsibility of determining
whether full disclosure was practical in unfair labor practice hearings. 21 Finally, although the court recognized that the Board's
insistence on compliance with discovery regulations might constitute an abuse of discretion where a party made a sufficient showing
of need for the documents, it held that Vapor Blast had not demonstrated that it was "prejudiced, surprised, or in any way put at a
disadvantage" because of the denial of discovery. 22

II.

DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

The legislative history of section IO(b) provides little insight into
whether Congress intended NLRB discovery procedures. to be
governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. During the
congressional debates on the Taft-Hartley Act, 23 Senator Taft
criticized the tendency of administrative law judges to admit virtually anything into evidence, thereby causing great delays in the
adjudication of unfair labor practices. 24 As · a result of Senator
Taft's comments section lO(b) was amended to establish
guidelines, based upon the rules of evidence in use in federal
district courts, for limiting what evidence could be admitted. 25 The
287 F.2d 402, 405 (1961).
The court noted that "[the Board] has determined that it is necessary to proper
administration to stamp as confidential all documents in its possession." Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22
Id. at 408. Later cases adopting this reasoning include Electromec Design & Dev. Co.
v. NLRB. 409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273
(5th Cir. 1967); Trojan Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB. 356 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1966). See NLRB
v. Wichita Televison Inc., 277 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Gala-Mo Arts, Inc., 232
F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1956), for decisions which preceded Vapor Blast, but applied similar
reasoning.
23
Pub. L. No. 80-101, § IO(b), 61 Stat. 146 (1947).
24
93 CoNG. REC. 6860 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
2s Id.18
19
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"so far as is practicable" phrase was inserted to allow administrative law judges "considerable discretion" as to what evidence was
admissible. 26 There is no indication that Congress anticipated the
considerable effect that application of these evidentiary rules
would have on the Board's discovery procedures.
An agency's administrative procedures must satisfy the rem1irPmPnt<:
nror.Pclnr:::i 1. cl11P
iclPr:::ition,;;
,-- ---------- of
--- r---------.
--- nrorp,;;,;;
r--------· 27 ron
_ _,,_. .,. ...., _____
. . . _. . . . . . of
--- nror---

cedural due process traditionally involve a balancing test between
the government's interest in the procedures adopted and the citi7
zen's interest in greater safeguards. 28 In applying due process
standards to NLRB discovery rules, the courts must consider the
competing interests of charged parties, employee-witnesses, and
the NLRB. The charged party is primarily concerned with having a
full and fair hearing.~ 9 In deciding whether NLRB hearings satisfy
due process standards, the court must consider the unfairness to
the charged party who may be tried without having been fully
apprised of the circumstances sµrrounding the alleged unfair labor
practice. 30 Moreover, denial of discovery can deprive a charged
party of the opportunity to adequately prepare a defense. 31 Without discovery of witness statements, for example, the charged
party may be unable to effectively cross-examine the Board's
witnesses. 32 Moreover, the charged party may not be allowed
sufficient time to gather evidence with which to rebut testimony,
thus his chances of prevailing at the hearing would be greatly
diminished. 33 Due process also requires that the courts consider
the severity of the punishment resulting from an adverse finding. 34
The harsher the penalties, the greater the amount of due process
protection that is required. 35 Since the sanctions imposed by the
NLRB are relatively slight, ranging from cease and desist orders to
reinstatement with back pay, 36 there may not be a compelling need
to provide extensive procedural safeguards in Board hearings.
Drawing an analogy between NLRB proceedings and criminal

Id.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
•s Id.
29
Id. at 268.
3
Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,268 (1970). (The Court stated that in proceedings
to deny welfare recipients their benefits, both a letter and personal meetings were effective
to fully inform the recipients of the nature of the proceedings.).
31
McLain Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 521 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1974).
32
Barnes & Noble Bookstores v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
33 Id.
34
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
35
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969).
36
29 U .S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
26

27

°
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trials, many courts have argued that the discovery rule.contained in
the Jencks Act 37 should apply in NLRB proceedings. 38 The Jencks
Act provides that a witness affidavit may be disclosed only after
the witness has testifed in court. Courts favorin·g the application of
this principle in NLRB hearings have argued that Congress could
not have intended charged parties to have greater rights of discovery than criminal defendants. 39 This view, however, does not consider that the more limited rights to discovery in the criminal
setting are offset by procedural safeguards not available to respondents in agency proceedings, such as the right to a trial by jury and
a greater burden of proof that must be satisfied before the defendant can be found guilty. 40
The employee-witness has an interest in protection from retaliation by his employer or union. 41 Although section 8 of the NLRA 42
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer or union to
retaliate against an employee for giving testimony, employers and
unions may be able to fabricate "good cause" for their actions. 43
Moreover, forcing an employee to file an unfair labor practice
charge to enforce his rights places a heavy burden on those who
give testimony to Board agents. Indeed, employer retaliation
against employees who provide information to Board agents may
tend to have a chilling effect on other potential witnesses who are
thus discouraged from asserting their rights.
The interests of the Board are also undercut by employer and
union retaliation because witness statements comprise the eviden-

37

18 U .S.C. § 3500(a) (1970) provides:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in
the possession of the United States which was made by a government witness or
prospective government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of
subpoena, discovery or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
The Jencks Act was passed to regulate discovery procedures in criminal trials. The
specific goals of the Act were to limit defendants' discovery to the signed witness statements, and to preclude any discovery of such statements prior to the witness' testimony in
court. The purpose of the legislation was to limit the effects of the Supreme Court decision in
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), which ordered the production of FBI reports
containing the requested witness statements. See S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957).
38
See NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Vapor
Blast Mfg. Co .. 287 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961); Barceloneta Shoe
Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
39
Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
40
M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 411 (1969).
41
NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402,407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823
(1961).
42
29 u.s.c. § 158 (1970).
43
Employers may coerce their employees in many ways. Besides discharge, employees
could be transferred to less desirable or lower paying jobs, harassed, ostracized by fellow
employees, or denied promotions, bonuses, or other fringe benefits. Unions might also
coerce members who give testimony against them, either by informally ostracizing the
members or by forcing employers to discharge them ..
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tiary basis of the Board's case in unfair labor practice hearings. 44
Any premature release of such statements which might deter potential witnesses or unfairly benefit the charged party by revealing
the Board's case would interfere with the Board's legitimate interest in prosecuting unfair labor practices. Since the Board releases
witness statements immediately after testimony, 45 however, the
Board's present discovery policy merely delays, not eliminates,
the possibility of retaliation. 46 Moreover, in many cases a charged
party may know who the witnesses for the Board will be before
th.ey testify. In sum, the fact that witness statements have been
released may not contribute to the employer's or union's ability to
retaliate. 47
In addition to the relative interests of the parties, there are other
factors that may affect the application of due process standards.
The nature of the requested materials may be an important additional factor. 48 The sworn affidavit of a person who will later be
called as a witness will not usually differ substantially from the
testimony at the hearing, nor will it reveal the identity of one who
would otherwise have remained anonymous. Thus, the disclosure
of these documents would have few adverse consequences to
either witnesses or the Board, but would aid charged parties in
preparing their cases. O_n the other hand, the information contained
in a field examiner's notes are likely to consist of the opinions or
legal theories of the interviewer and thus offer an unfair advantage
to the charged party if disclosed.
A second factor to be considered is whether the information is
helpful or damaging to the charged party. By knowingly withholding a statement which tends to vindicate the charged party, the
Board violates basic principles of fairness and undermines the
validity of the hearings. There is also no incentive to retaliate
against an employee for presenting favorable evidence. 49 If the
statement is damaging to the charged party, the issue is less clear.
While the possibility of retaliation exists, disclosure of the statement may make the strength of the Board's case more apparent,

See note 4 supra.
See note IO supra.
46 See Barnes & Noble Bookstores v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
47 The recognition a witness receives by having his statement released may afford some
protection. In order to prevail on a charge of retaliation the Board need only show that the
employer suspected that the employee spoke to Board agents. Maple City Stamping Co., 200
NLRB 743, 759 (1972). The release of the witness' statement informs the employer that the
employee has cooperated with the Board. If retaliation ensues, the Board will have no
trouble establishing the employer's knowledge. Where the Board's burden has been so
greatly simplified, the employer may be inhibited from retaliatory action. See generally
NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
48 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
49 See Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2915 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
•

44
45
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and persuade the charged party to settle the matter more informally
without a full-fledged hearing. 50
Finally, the relationship of the witness to the charged party is an
important factor. When the witness is not susceptible to retaliation
there is no compelling reason to deny discovery .51 For example,
the Board should permit discovery when the witness is a union
official testifying against an employer, a supervisor testifying
against a union, or a nonemployee bystander unrelated to either
side.
Ill. POST-FOIA DISCOVERY

A. Background of the 1967 Act

Prior to the passage of the FOIA, federal agencies were generally
able to withhold information from the public. 52 Relying on the
vague provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 53
the agencies justified nondisclosure on the grounds that the public
interest required secrecy or that there was good cause for keeping
the material confidential. 54 The agencies also relied upon the APA
requirement that a citizen be an interested party, properly and
directly concerned with the requested information, to receive government documents. 55
Responding to widespread discontent over government secrecy,
Congress amended the APA in 1967 by enacting the Freedom of
Information Act, 56 with the declared purpose of permitting greater
access to government documents. 57 In determining which documents should be withheld from the public, the FOIA seeks to
establish a uniform standard for disclosure by balancing the public
interest in obtaining information against the confidentiality interests of the agencies and individuals involved. 58 The FOIA requires
50 See Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2645, 2647 (W.D. Tenn. 1976);
Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 90 LRRM 3138, 3144 (D.S.C. 1975).
51
52

Jd.

S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965).
60 Stat. 238 (1946) provides in pertinent part: "Save as otherwise directed by statute,
matters of official record shall in accordance with published rules be made available to
persons properly and directly concerned except for information held confidential for good
cause found."
54
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1966); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., lsi
Sess. 5 (1%5).
55
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1966); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1965).
56
See 5 U .S.C. § 552 (1967); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1965).
57
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1965).
58
120 CONG. REc. 517,033-34 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart).
53

484

Journal of Law Reforin

[VoL. 10:476

full disclosure of all agency material on demand, except for nine
specific categories of documents. 59 The agency has the burden of
demonstrating that material comes within one of the exemptions, 60
and an agency's refusal to supply information may be challenged in
federal district court. 61
The Board has relied on only two of the specified exemptions in
virtually all of the FOIA suits in which it has been a defendant;·
exemption 5, which deais with inter- and intra-agency memoranda,
and exemption 7, which covers investigatory files of law enforcement agencies. 62
B. Exemption 5

Exemption 5 provides that inter-agency and intra-agency
memoranda or letters which would not otherwise be available in
litigation are exempt from the disclosure requirements of the
FOIA. 63 Congress enacted this. provision because it feared that
disclosure of agency memora·nda would inhibit frank communication between and within agencies and impair agencies' operations
by revealing their legal or investigative theories. 64
The courts have been divided over whether the Board can rely
on exemption 5 to deny. disclosure of witness statements. 65 In

59
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1967). The
nine exempt categories pertain to documents which are (I) required by Executive order to be
kept secret, (2) internal personnel rules, (3) exempted by another statute, (4) trade secrets,
(5) inter- or intra-agency memoranda, (6) personnel and medical files, (7) investigatory files
of law enforcement agencies, (8) condition reports of agencies regulating financial institutions, and (9) geological or geophysical data.
60
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
61 Id.
62
See Fuselier & Moeller, NLRB Investigatory Records: Disclosure. Under the Freedom
of Information Act, JOU. RICH. L. REV. 541, 544 (1976). For a general dicussion of the
issues raised by the Board in FOIA suits, see Sarnoff & Falkin, The Freedom of Information
Act and the NLRB, 15 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 1267 (1974); Note, Backdooring the
NLRB: Use and Abuse of the Amended FO/Afor Administrative Discovery, 8 LOY. CHI. L.
J. 145 (1976).
63
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970) provides: "This section does not apply to matters that are
.•. (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; .... "
64
Decisions allowing disclosure under exemption 5 include Amerace Corp. v. NLRB, 92
LRRM 3497 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2645 (W.D.
Tenn. 1976); Local 30, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp.
520 (E.D. Pa. 1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976);
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Deering
Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 90 LRRM 3138 (D.S.C. 1975). Courts denying disclosure on the basis
of exemption 5 include Hook Drugs v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2797 (S. D. Ind. 1976); Atlas Indus.
v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2676 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Jamco Int'I. Inc. v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2446
(N.D. Okla. 1976); Marathon LeToumeau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss.
1976).
65
See H. Rep. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. JO (1966).
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Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 66 the court held that witness statements did not fall within the scope of exemption 5 because they
were not inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda. The court noted
that witness statements were generated by private citizens, not
transmitted from one government employee to another. 67 The
court also observed that no evidence of the deliberative processes
of the Board were contained in the statements. 68 Similarly, in
Amerace Corporation v. NLRB, 69 the court denied the Board's
right to withhold witness statements, finding that neither established precedent nor the legislative history of the FOIA indicated
that purely factual informati(?n, such as that contained in witness
statements, could be withheld from the public under exemption
5_10
In Jamco International, Inc. v. NLRB, 71 however, the court
held that witness statements, field examiner's notes, trial preparation materials of field examiners and attorneys, and similar documents gathered as evidence come within exemption 5. The court
argued that exemption 5 was intended to employ the same criteria
as Rule 26(b )(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 72 which
provides that purely factual material, if prepared in contemplation
of litigation, constitutes an attorney's work product and is not
normally subject to discovery. 73
The decision whether an agency document is discoverable under
exemption 5 should involve a two-step determination. First, the
courts should determine whether the requested material is an interor intra-agency memorandum.-lf it is not an agency memorandum,
it should be disclosed. If it is an agency memorandum, the courts
must decide if it would ordinarily be discoverable in civil litigation.
In making this determination, courts have considered whether the
66
92 LRRM 2915 (E.D. Tex. 1976). After being charged with an unfair labor practice,
Temple-Eastex sought witness statements from the Board. Disclosure was denied by the
Regional Director and the General Counsel. Temple-Eastex then initiated a suit under the
FOIA.
61
Id. at .2917.
68
Id. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89-90 (1973). The Supreme Court has endorsed a
narrow reading of exemption 5 based on the distinction between materials which contain
primarily factual information and those which reflect the deliberative process of the agency.
69
92 LRRM 3497 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
70
Id. at 3498. This interpretation of exemption 5 has been adopted by courts in FOIA suits
involving other agencies. In Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1976), for example,
two private citizens sought disclosure of the federal government's development plans for a
supersonic transport aircraft. The defendant, director of the Office of Science and Technology, refused to·comply with the request, claiming that the report was an inter-agency
memorandum. exempt from disclosure under exemption 5. The court noted that the purpose
of the exemption is to encourage a free exchange of ideas during the policymaking process.
The court found, however, that this rationale did not apply to "purely factual or investigative reports." 448 F.2d at 1007. See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973).
71
91 LRRM 2446 (N.D. Okla. 1976).
12
Id. at 2449.
73
28 U.S.C. Rule 26(b)(3) (1970).
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document was generated by agency personnel or by private citizens. 74 A document which does not originate in an agency is not
considered to be an inter- or intra-agency memorandum. 75 Courts
have also considered the relationship of the document to the deliberative or policymaking functions of the agency. 76 If the material
is an integral part of such processes, it is considered an agency
memorandum, but where the material is purely factual,. it is not
vie\.ved as an agency memorandum and disclosure has been ailowed. 77
If the document is found to be an agency memorandum, a second
determination is required to decide the document's discoverability.
If the memorandum would be "otherwise available in litigation,"
discovery is permitted. 78
In Jamco, the court made the two determinations in reverse
order, finding that the witness statements constituted attorney
work products before determining whether they were agency
memoranda. If the court had first considered whether the document was an agency memorandum, it would never have reached
the "available in litigation" test, because witness statements do
not qualify as inter- or intra-agency memoranda under exemption
5. 79 Such statements neither originate with NLRB personnel, nor
do they involve policymaking or deliberative functions; they are,
ostensibly, factual documents.
C. Exemption 7
The other exemption relied upon by the NLRB in defending
FOIA actions to discover witness statements is exemption 7. 80 As
74
See Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. i972); Soucie
v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM
2586 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
75 See H. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966): "[A] full and frank exchange of
opinions would be impossible if all internal communications were made public." (Emphasis
added).
.
76 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973); National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 516 F.2d 1229, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Soucie v. David, 448
F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871,874 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
77 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 89 (1973); Tennesseean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir.
1972); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935,939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970). The policy-fact distinction is also supported by the legislative history of the FOIA.
H. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong:, 2d Sess. 10(1966). See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
9 (1965).
78 The "available in litigation" test, as applied to NLRB discovery, has generally focused
on the attorney work product exemption. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132
(1975); Jamco Int'I, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2446 (N.D. Okla. 1976). In proceedings
involving other agencies it has been held that the "availaole in litigation" standard parallels
civil discovery rules. Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir.
1975); Schwartz v. IRS, 511 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
79
See notes 69-78 and accompanying text supra.
• 0 See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
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originally enacted, it provided that information in the investigative
files of law enforcement agencies, except that which would otherwise be available in litigation, was exempt from the disclosure
requirements of the FOIA. 81 Congress created this exemption to
ensure that law enforcement agencies would be able to present as
strong a case as possible in court. 82 Although the FOIA was designed to encourage disclosure, 83 courts initially adopted a broad
interpretation of exemption 7 in suits against the NLRB. 84 In the
first case decided under the FOIA, Barceloneta Shoe Corporation
v. Compton, 85 the court held that witness statements were exempt
from disclosure under exemption 7. 86 Comparing NLRB witness
statements to statements given to FBI agents, the court asserted
that the former were within the scope of the law enforcement
investigatory files definition. 87 The court looked to the Jencks
Act 88 and found that neither it nor any other law required production of the witness statements. 89 Subsequent decisions adopted th_e
Barceloneta court's interpretation of exemption 7 without closely
examining its rationale. 90 This approach resulted in the per se

81
5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970). This exemption originally provided: "This section does not
apply to matters that are... (7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent
available by law to a party other than an agency; .... "
82
120 CONG. REc. 517,034 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart).
83
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
.
84
Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834
(1974); Clement Bros. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1%9); Electromec Design
& Dev. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v.
Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
85
271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1976).
86
The Memorandum of Decision and Order in the Barceloneta case was issued after only
one working day of preparation so that the order could take effect before the unfair labor
practice hearing. 271 F. Supp. at 591, 593. Unfortunately, subsequent decisions adopted the
Barce/oneta court's interpretation of the FOIA •without carefully evaluating its hastily
conceived analysis.
The court, as an alternative basis for denying disclosure, held that witness statements
were exempt under the invasion of privacy provision. 271 F. Supp. at 594. See 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(6) (1970). This exemption provides: "This section does not apply to matters that are
... (6) personnel and medical files and similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; .... " This provision applies to all
government documents, not merely investigatory files of law enforcement agencies, and is
similar to _the present exemption 7(C). 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(c). The Board has relied more
often on exemption 7(C) than exemption 6. See notes 147-55 and accompanying text infra.
87
271 F. Supp. 591. 593 (D.P.R. 1967).
88
18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1970). See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
89
271 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D. P.R. 1967). The court also relied on the possibility of employer
retaliation and its chilling effect on testimony in subsequent investigations. Id. at 594.
90
Wellman Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 430-31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
834 (1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 419 U.S. 1204
(1971); Capital Cities Communications. Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971, 975 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Philadelphia Newspapers. Inc. v. NLRB, 343 F. Supp. 1176. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Clement Bros. Co .. Inc. v. NLRB. 282 F. Supp. 540. 542 (N.D. Ga. 1968), enforced. 407
F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969). Barceloneta was followed outside the NLRB setting as well. See
Center for Nat'! Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger. 502 F.2d 370 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Dillow v. Brinegar. 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (percuriam). cert. denied. 419
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denial of all open investigatory files. In Wellman Industries, Inc. v.
NLRB, 91 for example, the employer sought witness statements
from the Board during an unfair labor practice hearing. In denying
disclosure the court rejected a "balancing of equities" approach, 92
finding that the statements were part of an open investigatory file 93
and therefore per se nondisclosable. 94
Dissatisfied with this broad judicial interpretation of exemption
7, 95 Congress amended the FOIA in I 974 to narrow the scope of
exemption 7 .96 Criticizing the prior judicial interpretation of
exemption 7 as creating a "stone wall" to disclosure, Senator
Hart, the author of the amendment, explained that its purpose was
to preclude the per se denial of discovery of investigatory files 97
and to require the courts to decide each case on its own merits

U.S. 974 (1974); Weisberg v. Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Aspin v. Dep't of Defense, 348 F. Supp. 1081 (D.D.C. 1972), affd, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D. Del. 1972), affd, 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.
1973); Benson v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (D. Neb. 1970); Consumers Union,
Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1%8).
1
•
490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1974).
92
/d. at 429.
93
Open investigatory files consist of material gathered in preparation for litigation which
.is not yet complete. Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3251 (1976). Once all reasonably foreseeable litigation has ended, the files are
designated "closed."
94
490 F.2d 427, 429-30 (4th Cir. 1974). The witness statements sought were gathered for
an earlier proceeding concerning a representation election. Wellman contested the results of
the election by refusing to bargain with the union and raising the invalidity of the election
as a defense to the resulting unfair labor practice charge. Wellman's contention that the .
statements were not part of an open investigatory file was rejected by the court as an
excessively narrow interpretation of exemption 7.
95
In response to a question from Senator Kennedy, Senator Hart explicitly stated that the
Amendments were intended to overrule such cases as Center for Nat'! Policy Review on
Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar,
1194 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Weisberg v.
Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974);
Aspin v. Dep't of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 120 CoNG. REC. 517,033 (1974).
96
5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. V 1975). As amended, exemption 7 provides:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are... (7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement
proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the
identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal
law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel ....
97
120 CONG. REC. 517,033 (1974). During the debates on the 1974 Amendments Senator
Hart summarized the purpose of the 1974 Amendments:
Recently, the courts have interpreted the seventh exception to the Freedom of
Information Act to be applied whenever an agency can show that the document
sought is an investigatory file compiled for law enforcement purposes-a stone wall
at that point. The court would have the exemption applied without the need of the
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without resorting to judicially-created "wooden and mechanical"
rules. 98
As part of the congressional effort to aid the courts in deciding
FOIA suits on a case-by-case basis, the 1974 Amendments provided
that courts had the right to make in camera inspections of all
requested documents prior to ruling on disclosure. 99 This provision
was a reaction to cases holding that no such right existed under the
original FOIA . 100 In camera inspection allows the court to weigh
the interests of the parties and to insure that no disclosed information will unduly impinge on the interests of an individual or agency.
The 1974 Amendments have stipulated requests for disclosure of
NLRB documents, especially witness statements. 101 Adhering to
its traditional policy, however, the Board has resisted disclosure of
its documents. 102 Although the courts have been more willing to
compel disclosure under the 1974 Amendments than under the
original FOIA, 103 a majority of courts have upheld the Board's
policy of nondisclosure. 104
The exemption most effectively used by the Board is exemption

Id.
98

agency to show why the disclosure of the particular document should not be
made ....
. . . Let me clarify the instances in which nondisclosure would obtain: First,
wh~re the production of a record would interfere with enforcement procedures.
This would apply whenever the Government's case in court-a concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding-would be harmed by the premature release of
evidence or information not in the possession of known or potential defendants.
This would apply also where the agency could show that the disclosure of the
!nfor~ati~n would substantially harm such proceedings by impeding any necessary
mvest1gat1on before the proceeding. In determining whether or not the information
to be released will interfere with a law enforcement proceeding it is only relevant to
make such determination in the context of the particular enforcement proceeding.

Id. at 517,034.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(b) (Supp. V 1975). However, in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973),
the Supreme Court ruled that when a document is classified as "top secret" by Executive
Order or through the President's delegated authority, courts have no right to in camera
inspection of the classified documents.
100
Aspin v. Dep't of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Weisberg v. Dep't of
Justice, 489 F.2d I 195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). See also Frankel
v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
101
27 LAB. L.J. 190 (1976). See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
102
27 LAB. L.J. 190 (1976) (statement of Chairwoman Murphy). The NLRB has not
amended its regulations concerning disclosure, 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (1976), indicating that
the policy of nondisclosure is still in force.
103
See Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2586 (N .D. Ala. 1976); Barnes &
Noble Bookstores v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
NLRB, 92 LRRM 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
10
• Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3251
(1976); Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Goodfriend Western Corp. v. NLRB, 45 U .S.L. W. 3306 (1976); Climax Molybdenum Co. v.
NLRB, 92 LRRM 3466 (10th Cir. 1976), Gimbel Bros. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2733 (E.D. Pa.
1976); Marathon LeTourneau v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Pacific Photo
Type, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2560 (D. Haw. 1976); Atlas Indus. v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2676
(N.D. Ohio 1976).
99
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7(A), which allows agencies to withhold investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes if disclosure would interfere
with their enforcement proceedings . 105 The courts have generally
upheld nondisclosure of witness statements under exemption 7(A),
noting the danger of retaliation against witnesses, the possible
prejudice to the Board's case, and the chilling effect on future
investigations. 106
The leading case dealing with exemption 7(A) is Title Guarantee
Company v. NLRB, 101 in which the Second Circuit held that witness statements in pending unfair labor practice proceedings were
exempt from disclosure. Acknowledging that the 1974 amendments
were intended to increase disclosure by narrowing the exemption,
the court, nevertheless, noted that the legislative history distinguished between open and closed investigatory files .108 Since the
adoption of the I974 Amendments, closed files have generally been
held to be disclosable. 109
Open files were per se nondisclosable under the original
FOIA, 110 and the Title Guarantee court found that the 1974
amendments were not intended by Congress to alter the disclosability of open files .111 Moreover, the court stated that disclosure of
witness statements prior to testimony would necessarily interfere
with the Board's enforcement proceedings by revealing the
Board's case in advance, thereby allowing charged parties to develop defenses which might permit unfair labor practices to go
unremedied. In the court's view, disclosure would also inhibit
potential witnesses from giving information to the Board for fear of
retaliation.11 2 Finally, the court asserted that Congress could not
have intended to alter NLRB discovery procedures by a "backdoor" amendment to the FOIA. In view of the delicate balance

5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
See Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3251
(1976); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 3466 (10th Cir. 1976); Goodfriend
Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (I st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Goodfriend Western
Corp. v. NLRB, 45 U.S.L.W. 3306 (1976); Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.
Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Sealand Terminal Corp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2952 (S.D. Miss.
1976). See notes 23-51 and accompanying text supra.
107
534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3251 (1976).
10
• Id. at 492. See note I 12 infra.
109
Id. at 490.
11
° Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Wellford v.
Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591 (D. Del. 1972); afj'd
per curiam. 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1024 (1973).
111
Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 45 U.S.L.W. 3251
(1976). See Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 430-31 (4th Cir.). cert. denied, 419
U.S. 834 (1974).
112
534 F.2d at 491. The court rejected a third basis for interference; namely, that witness
statements constituted attorney work products. See notes 78-79 and accompanying text
supra. Investigative material other than witness statements was not found to be per se
nondi sclosable.
·
105

10

•
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obtained by the NLRB in labor-management relations, it was unlikely that the Board's discovery procedures were meant to be
affected by a statute dealing with agency disclosure in general. 113
The reasoning of the Title Guarantee court with respect to
exemption 7(A) was expressly adopted in Goodfriend Western
Corporation v. NLRB. 114 The First Circuit denied disclosure of
witness statements, specifically rejecting the district court's attempt to accommodate the interests of the charged party by allowing disclosure twenty-four hours prior to the hearing. 115 The court
noted that it was more efficient for the Board, rather than the
court, to make a case-by-case determination of what information
was disclosable. 116 The court also stated that it was not the intent
of Congress to require courts to hear every request for disclosure . 117 The Tenth Circuit reached a similar result in Climax
Molybdenum Company v. NLRB, 118 where it held that the 1974
Amendments applied only to closed investigatory files, and that
Congress did not intend to alter Wellman and its progeny. 119 The
court also rejected a case-by-case adjudication of NLRB disclosure
proceedings arising under the FOIA, relying on a presumption that
there is interference in enforcement proceedings whenever open
investigatory files are re leased . 120
Some courts have interpreted the 1974 Amendments differently.
In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. NLRB, 121 for example, the
court ordered disclosure of witness statements prior to an unfair
labor practice hearing, finding that they did not come within
exemption 7(A). An important factor in the decision was the fact
that the witnesses involved were not susceptible to retaliation
because they were nonemployee union officers. 122 The court observed, however, that where employer retribution was a possibility, nondisclosure of witness statements prior to the hearings could
only delay retaliation since the employer would receive the statements immediately after the hearing. 123 The court rejected the
Board's contention that disclosure would prevent it from obtaining

113

Id. at 491-92.
535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3306 (1976).
The district court contended that the twenty-four hour period would give the charged
party time for adequate pre-hearing preparation without creating an opportunity for retaliation against the witnesses. Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 411 F. Supp. 454, 458 (D.
Mass. 1976).
116
535 F.2d at 147.
111 Id.
118
92 LRRM 3466 (10th Cir. 1976).
119
Id. at 3467-68.
120
Id. at 3468.
121
92 LRRM 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
122
See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
123
92 LRRM at 2075. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
11

•
115
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evidence in the future due to the chilling· effect on potential witnesses, and would make it more difficult to prevail against charged
parties if the Board's strategies were revealed prior to the hearing.
Relying on the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments, the
court noted that investigatory files are not exempt per se and that
an agency must satisfy the burden of proof by showing that a
specific harm to its enforcement proceedings would result from
disclosure. 124 Emphasizing that the Board's position was tantamount to a return to the "wooden and mechanical" standards
prevalent before the adoption of the 1974 Amendments, 125 the
court adopted a case-by-case approach 126 involving in camera
inspection of the files . 127
Similarly, in Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash 128 the court, after
discussing the legislative history of the FOIA, concluded that
agencies relying on exemption 7(A) must demonstrate specific
harm to its enforcement efforts. In rejecting a claim under exemption 7(A), the court declared that it would be directly contrary to
the spirit of the 1974 amendments to refuse disclosure simply
because the Board's own regulations did not allow discovery in an
NLRB proceeding. 129 The court also observed that disclosure of
the requested information could only have a beneficial effect on the
outcome of the proceedings. 130
In Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB 131 the court adopted a middle
position, balancing the various interests involved. The court noted
that witness statements of those hostile to the charged party should
be withheld to protect the witnesses from retaliation. The court
held, however, that statements of witnesses favorable to the charged
party were disclosable because there was no danger of retaliation .132 The court viewed the Board's refusal to release any statements as overly restrictive and inconsistent with the FOIA's purpose of providing the fullest possible disclosure. 133 The Board's
policy of releasing statements only after the witness had testified
would preclude Temple-Eastex from ever seeing statements that

12
• Id. at 2074-75. Other courts have applied this reasoning. See Robbins Tire & Rubber
Co. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2586 (N.D. Ala. 1976); Barnes & Noble Bookstores v. NLRB, 92
.LRRM 2169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); NLRB v. Schill Steel Prod., Inc., 408 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1%9).
125
92 LRRM at 2074-75.
12a Id.
127
Id. at 2075.
128
90 LRRM 3138 (D.S.C. 1975).
29
'
/d. at3143-44.
130
Id. at 3144. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
13
' 92 LRRM 2915 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
132
Id. at 2918. Here the employer was the charged party. The statements released to the
employer were made by nonunion employees and were favorable to the employer, so there
was no danger of retaliation by either the union or the employer.
133
Id. at 2917.
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might aid its case, since the Board would never call a witness who
would testify on behalf of the charged party . 134 Finally, the court
observed that it could determine whether the statements were
favorable or hostile by an in camera inspection.
The expansive interpretation given exemption 7(A) by the courts
in cases such as Title Guarantee and Climax Molybdenum conflicts
with the purpose of the 1974 Amendments. The legislative history
of exemption 7(A) does not support the reliance of these courts on
the distinction between open and closed investigatory files as the
basis for deciding whether disclosure is allowable. In discussing
the Amendments, the only factor which Senator Hart referred to
was whether the files would interfere with enforcement proceedings if released. 135 In some cases it is possible to disclose open files
without interfering with enforcement proceedings, or damaging an
agency's case in court. 136 The simplistic dichotomy between open
and closed investigatory files does not account for the effect of
disclosure on the interests of the parties. 137 This distinction also
fails to account for the identity of witnesses and the varying contents of their statements. 138
The rule that open investigatory files are per se nondisclosable
also renders much of the 1974 Amendments ineffective. FOIA
cases were intended to be decided on a case-by-case basis, 139 and if
courts automatically deny disclosure of every open file, then the
merits of any particular case are not considered. 140 The per se rule
also precludes the effective use of the in camera inspections, which
are expressly permitted by the 1974 Amendments. 141 The provision
for in camera inspections implicitly underscores the importance of
a case-by-case approach to the FOIA; if documents were to be
generically categorized as per se disclosable or nondisclosable,
there would be little use for in camera inspection.
It has been argued that courts cannot fully consider each FOIA
suit individually, and that in the interest of economy and efficiency
they must either apply a rule allowing a quick disposition of the
case, 142 or defer to the authority of the respective agencies to
determine the merits of each case. 143 However, the purpose of the
13•
135

Jd.

120 CONG. REC. 517,033 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart).
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976); TempleEastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 2915 (E.D. Tex. 1976); Deering-Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 90LRRM 3138 (D.S.C. 1975).
137
See notes 23-51 and accompanying text supra.
138
See notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra.
139
120 CONG. REc. 517,034 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart).
1 0
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1967 FOIA was to remove from the agencies the power to determine the disclosability of their own files. 144 The elimination of the
inflexible rules that summarily removed FOIA suits from the
courts was another purpose of the 1974 Amendments. 145
Moreover, the fear that the courts will be flooded with FOIA cases
is groundless. Even if courts decide each FOIA case on its merits,
a standard will evolve that will be perceptible to the NLRB and
counsel for charged parties. Once this happens, the parties will
know under what circumstances witness statements will not be
available, and thus will seldom resort to litigation to contest instances of nondisclosure.
The other portions of exemption 7 relied upon by the Board to
protect the confidentiality of its files have played a less prominent
role in litigation. Although the Board has often sought to employ
them, the courts have generally found these portions of exemption
7 inapplicable without extensive discussion. 146 Exemption 7(C)
provides that investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes may be withheld where disclosure of the requested material will constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy . 147 The Attorney General of the United States has taken the position that
exemption 7(C) applies only to statements containing information
relating to purely personal matters such as marital status, medical
conditions and family disputes. 148 In FOIA suits involving the
NLRB 149 as well as other agencies, 150 the courts have uniformly
agreed with this interpretation. In Marathon LeTourneau Company v. NLRB, 151 the court rejected the Board's contention that
"the right to privacy includes the right to select the people to
whom one will communicate his ideas. " 152 The court relied on the
personal data standard 153 adopted by the Attorney General and
other courts. 154
144

See notes 52-61 and accompanying text supra.
120 CoNG. REc. 517,040 (1974). Senator Hart stated, "Until about 9 or 12 months ago
the courts consistently had approached [FOIA cases] on a balancing basis, which is exactly
what this amendment seeks to do." Id.
146
See generally Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3251 (1976); Amerace Corp. v. NLRB, 92 LRRM 3497 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); Jamco
Int'I, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 LRRM 2447 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Local 30, United Slate, Tile, and
Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
147 5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
148
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Exemption 7(0) allows investigatory files of law enforcement
agencies to be withheld from disclosure if they have been gathered
from confidential sources . 155 The purpose of the confidential
source exemption is to protect the identity of the witness, not the
content of the statement. In order to sustain a claim under exemption 7(0), prevailing authority required an agency to present evidence that the requested information was received by the agency
under an express assurance of confidentiality . 156 Courts have usually held that information obtained from "confidential sources"
will never be released, even after the investigation has been concluded and all litigation ended. 157 Since witness statements must be
revealed after testimony, they should not be "confidential" under
this definition. Nevertheless, in Baptist Memorial Hospital v.
NLRB, 158 the court allowed the Board to withhold statements of
witnesses who had been told that their statements would not be
released. The court stated, however, that if the Board called any of
the witnesses who had been promised confidentiality, the statements would be given to the charged party after the witnesses had
testified. This decision raises several questions. The Board has
never empowered its field examiners to guarantee anonymity to
witnesses. 159 If the courts enforce unauthorized grants of confidentiality, they are rewarding the dishonesty of agents. On the other
hand, if the courts decline to enforce these unauthorized guarantees of confidentiality, witnesses may be deceived into giving
statements they would not have otherwise provided. In dealing
with promises of confidentiality authorized by the Board, the
courts are faced with a more difficult question. If the courts were to
deny disclosure of witness statements elicited by such promises of
confidentiality, the Board would circumvent the FOIA entirely by
assuring all potential witnesses that their statements are confiden-

155
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (Supp. V 1975). Exemption 7(0) provides: "This section shall
not apply to matters that are... (7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
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... (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source ... " (emphasis added).
156
Marathon LeToumeau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Local 30,
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Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 534
F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3251 (1976); Cessna Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 405
F. Supp. 1042 (D. Kan. 1975); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 90 LRRM 3138 (D.S.C. 1975).
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exemption 7(0). 534 F.2d at 489 n.11.
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92 LRRM 2645 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
.
159
Fuselier & Moeller, NLRB Investigatory Records: Disclosure Under the Freedom of
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tial. 160 There may be times when the Board has a legitimate interest
in the confidentiality of witness statements, 161 but the courts rather
than the Board should determine when the Board's interests outweigh the interests of the party seeking disclosure. 162 Strict adherence to the offer of confidentiality standard applied in Baptist
Memorial invites abuse of the exemption, evades the purpose of
the 1974 Amendments, and may unnecessarily compromise the
rights of those requesting disclosure.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Traditionally the NLRB has denied requests for discovery in
unfair labor practice cases, and courts have been willing to enforce
the Board's regulations concerning discovery. Since the enactment
of the Freedom of Information Act in 1967, the Board has continued to contest requests for information by relying upon exemptions 5 and 7. In FOIA suits involving the NLRB many courts have
applied a rule which defines NLRB investigatory files as nondisclosable per se.
The intent of the 1967 FOIA and its 1974 Amendments was to
encourage full agency disclosure by declaring that all information is
to be released unless covered by a specific exemption. The burden
rests with the agency to prove the applicability of the exemption,
and courts are to decide each request for information on a caseby-case basis. The influential decision of Title Guarantee Company
v. NLRB, however, has led many courts to ignore congressional
intent and cursorily dismiss all FOIA suits against the NLRB by
application of the per se nondisclosable rule. Courts should
reexamine the legislative history of the FOIA and seek to implement its purpose more fully by evaluating requests individually
without resort to mechanical rules. Such rules neither require
agencies to meet their statutorily prescribed burden of proof, nor
do they allow full consideration of the public's interest in obtaining
government information.
-Del Dillingham
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